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1 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an attorney malpractice lawsuit and attorney-lien claim that settled for $40,000 
during a formal, Court-ordered mediation, with both sides represented by counsel and zero 
interaction between the parties. However, before the settlement was put on the record, defendant- 
attorney Kevin Dinius (“Dinius”) met alone with plaintiff David Kosmann (“Kosmann”), his 
former client, and convinced him to instead settle for $32,000. Dinius was able to convince 
Kosmann to take a lesser sum because Kosmann’s attorney Loren Messerly (“Messerly”) was 
not told of these renegotiations and was not present to protect his client from being deceived. 
During the secret meeting, Dinius bad-mouthed Messerly and used knowledge of his ex-client’s 
timidity and naivete to trick him into giving up $8,000 in exchange for a worthless release for 
Messerly. The mediator, Stephen Dunn (“Judge Dunn”), a District Judge from Bannock County, 
arranged the secret meeting for Dinius with Kosmann, and neither Judge Dunn, Dinius, nor 
Dinius’s attorney Yvonne Dunbar (“Dunbar”) told Messerly about the meeting. 
This was a flagrant violation of a foundational rule of American litigation. It was also a 
violation of Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2, which prohibits Idaho lawyers from 
having unauthorized communications with represented parties (aka: the “no-contact rule”). Rule 
4.2 required Dinius and Dunbar (and Judge Dunn) to ask Messerly if he consented to a meeting 
between just Dinius and Kosmann (Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn undoubtedly knew 
Messerly would not have allowed it). The no-contact rule has been in place for at least a century 
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to stop what happened here: a naive party manipulated by a lawyer to give up part of his 
settlement in exchange for something valueless -- release of non-existent liability for counsel.   
Upon learning what happened, Messerly immediately demanded that Dinius proceed with 
the original $40,0000 settlement. Dinius could have easily remedied the violation: apologize for 
the improper contact with a represented party and concede the original $40,000 settlement. 
Instead, Dinius claimed he did nothing wrong. In fact, Dinius and Dunbar instead argued that 
Kosmann and Messerly would be sanctioned if Kosmann failed to abide by this new agreement. 
Inexplicably, Judge Dunn supported Dinius, claiming no ethics violation and arguing to 
Kosmann that the amended agreement was the only enforceable agreement and he would pay 
expensive attorney fees (and possibly sanctions) if he challenged it. Unsurprisingly, Kosmann 
believed he had no choice. He was being threatened by two attorneys and a Judge. Against his 
attorney’s advice, Kosmann put the amended agreement on the record. Messerly put an objection 
on the record, to make clear that he denied the validity of the new terms and believed Kosmann 
had been cheated out of $8,000 and tricked into paying for a counsel release. On the record, 
Dunbar, Dinius, and Judge Dunn (1) admitted to facilitating the ex parte meeting that reduced 
Kosmann’s settlement by $8,000, and (2) did not deny failing to inform Messerly of the meeting.   
 Any ethical attorneys would not have secret negotiations, and if they somehow 
“innocently” erred, then they would have quickly remedied it. Dinius and Dunbar, however, 
refused to concede they had done anything improper and instead insisted they could use the court 
to profit from Dinius’s unauthorized contact, filing a motion to enforce the $32,000 settlement. 
Kosmann and Messerly were forced to ask the District Court to remedy the situation by awarding 
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the lost $8,000 settlement funds and reimbursing all attorney fees. Litigation should have been 
minimal because this should have been an easy issue to resolve. The no-contact rule is known by 
all lawyers and used every day in their practice, and Idaho has case law directly on point, 
Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 421, 925 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1996), holding that an 
Idaho attorney, even when a party in a lawsuit, cannot have contact with the represented 
opposing party without first obtaining explicit consent from opposing counsel. The rule is rooted 
in common sense policy that “prevents a lawyer from nullifying the protection a represented 
person has achieved by retaining counsel.” G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING, § 4.2.101 (2d ed. 1993) (quoted in Runsvold).  
The District Court, however, repeatedly refused to do justice and enforce Idaho ethical 
rules and caselaw precedent. On the record at the end of mediation, Dinius and Dunbar had 
asserted they did nothing wrong because they assumed Messerly knew about the ex parte 
meeting. In the subsequent litigation, however, Dinius and Dunbar changed their position to add 
many other excuses. The District Court initially ruled in favor of their new argument that Rule 
4.2 was inapplicable because Dinius was not “representing a client” other than himself. When 
presented with the Runsvold case rejecting that argument, the District Court just changed its 
position to reach the same result by relying on three other excuses. In the end, the Court not only 
refused to identify ethical violations or remedy them; it gave legal authorization to the 
violations by ruling that Dinius could enforce the reduced terms that would not exist but for 
unethical and unauthorized contact with a represented party.  
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As a final act of judicial abuse and retaliation, the District Court instead awarded 
monetary sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly. The sanctioned conduct was the “egregious” 
act of submitting a supplemental filing and accidentally forgetting to file a separate motion for 
leave (which “error” was immediately corrected). When Messerly pointed out a dozen reasons 
why this sanction was contrary to law and equity (including how Dinius violated Rule 11’s safe-
harbor requirement), the District Court again ignored the law and Kosmann’s arguments.   
Therefore, Kosmann asks the Court to reverse the District Court and (1) confirm that 
Dinius (with Dunbar and Judge Dunn’s assistance) violated IRPC 4.2 when he negotiated alone 
with the opposing party without first obtaining consent from opposing counsel, (2) remedy the 
damages caused by the ethical violation by awarding the $8,000 in lost settlement funds and 
reimbursing all post-mediation attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees, incurred because 
of Dinius and Dunbar’s refusal to voluntarily remedy their ethical violation, (3) reverse the 
monetary sanctions against Kosmann and sanction Dinius and Dunbar for abusive use of 
sanction requests, and (4) remand to a different district judge who will follow the law.     
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Two Issues in Two Cases to Settle at Mediation. 
The mediation at issue is tangentially related to litigation previously before this Court. 
See Kosmann v. Gilbride, 161 Idaho 363, 386 P.3d 504 (2016). Dinius represented Kosmann in 
that litigation against Leo Gilbride (“Gilbride”) regarding Kosmann’s residence. R. Vol. III, 
p.84. After losing Kosmann’s home to fraudster Gilbride, Dinius claimed that he was owed more 
than $50,000 in additional attorney fees. Id. Dinius filed a notice of attorney’s lien against the 
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$31,000 judgment that Gilbride owed to Kosmann (funds Kosmann loaned to Gilbride and then 
Gilbride tried to steal, claiming they were for his imaginary car parts). Id. 
 Gilbride posted a cash bond for the $31,000 judgment and filed an appeal to this Court 
seeking to recover approximately $100,000 in attorney fees as the “prevailing party,” which 
would have wiped out the judgment and bankrupted Kosmann. Id. Dinius refused to defend that 
appeal without first being paid the additional $50,000 he believed he was owed. Id. Kosmann 
hired Messerly as pro bono new counsel and eventually prevailed in defending the appeal. Id. 
Kosmann then asked the District Court to release the approximately $32,000 (after interest) cash 
bond, but the Court refused based on Dinius’s attorney lien. Supp.R., pp.12-20. Kosmann also 
filed a malpractice lawsuit against Dinius, pointing out numerous errors causing Kosmann to lose 
his home to an obvious fraudster. R. Vol. II, pp.12-82. The common-sense result, which Dinius 
failed to pursue, was the unwinding of the sale (based on fraud by Gilbride and the malpractice 
of the realtor who recommended and directed the transaction) and returning Kosmann’s lender to 
its secured position on the property. Id. Kosmann sought thousands of dollars in damages for 
Dinius’s malpractice. Id. Thus, there were two issues for resolution: Dinius’s claim to an 
additional $50,000 in fees and Kosmann’s claim to malpractice damages; tangentially, release of 
the $32,000 of Kosmann’s own money, held by the court for two years, was also at issue. 
2. At Court-Ordered Mediation, the Matters Settle for $40,000 to Kosmann. 
The District Court encouraged both parties to use the Court’s free mediation services and 
both parties agreed. On June 19, 2017, the Court issued its Mediation Order stating, “The Court 
hereby appoints Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, to serve as mediator” on “July 26, 2017, at 
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9:00 A.M. at the Canyon County Courthouse.” R. Vol. II, p.106. On that date, Kosmann (and his 
girlfriend) and his counsel Messerly appeared and were placed in a room, while Dinius and his 
counsel Dunbar were placed in a separate room (Dinius’ malpractice insurer was on the 
telephone in Dinius’s room), separated only by a wall. R. Vol. III, pp.61-62, ¶¶3-4; p.85-87, ¶¶6-
17; p.215, ¶3; pp.348-49, ¶¶2-3; 408-14, ¶¶5-6, 20-21. Judge Dunn met with each side 
separately. Id. All negotiations during the mediation were through the mediator (except for one 
heated discussion between Messerly and Dunbar in the hall). Id. The parties negotiated 
approximately five hours regarding an amount to be paid by Dinius’s malpractice insurer to settle 
all issues. Id.  Around 1 or 2 p.m., the parties reached an agreement for $40,000 to be paid 
to Kosmann and an “undisclosed amount” to be paid to Dinius. Id. Kosmann already 
had the $32,000 being held by the Court, so this was an agreement that the malpractice insurer 
would pay only $8,000 in new money to Kosmann and the undisclosed amount to 
Dinius. Id. Dinius requested for his payment to initially come from Kosmann’s $32,000 held by 
the Court and then his malpractice insurer would reimburse Kosmann (this strange money 
flow was used because the insurer was unwilling to directly pay its insured Dinius). Id. In 
exchange for their respective payments, Kosmann dropped his malpractice claims and Dinius 
dropping his claims for additional fees. Id.  
3. The Dispute About the Scope of the Mutual Release to Include Counsel.  
After reaching agreement about the key payment issues, the parties discussed a couple 
uncontested ancillary issues, i.e. a basic confidentiality and non-disparagement agreement. R. 
Vol. III, p.68-70, ¶¶10-12, 17-21, 27-28; pp.158-65; p.215, ¶3; pp.318-25. Also part of the “wrap 
 
7 
up,” the parties discussed the mutual release, and Kosmann said the scope of the release would 
include a protection against future lawsuits against his attorney Messerly. Id. Kosmann explained 
that Dinius threatened to sue Messerly twice (once during the mediation), and Kosmann believed 
such a lawsuit would be frivolous but he did not want his counsel tied up with frivolous litigation 
(because his counsel represented him, mostly pro bono, in two other active cases). Id. The 
release of counsel was discussed only after his $40,000 settlement amount was finalized, so 
Kosmann was not offering to pay anything for the release for his counsel (like Dinius had not 
paid anything for the confidentiality and non-disparagement add-on terms he wanted). Id. 
 Kosmann and Messerly were surprised when Dinius refused to include Messerly in the 
scope of the release, suggesting Dinius was planning on filing a frivolous lawsuit against 
Messerly. R., Vol. II, p.114-15, ¶¶2-4; Vol. III, pp.61-62, ¶¶3-4; pp.88-90, ¶¶18-32; p.215, ¶3; 
pp.408, ¶5. Judge Dunn indicated that Dinius and Dunbar claimed Dinius was ethically 
forbidden from agreeing to this release of counsel. Id. Judge Dunn took the side of Dinius and 
Dunbar and claimed that such a release was unethical to ask for, agree to, or accept, though 
Judge Dunn could not articulate what valid claim against Messerly was being released or why it 
was unethical to include a release of counsel that the client was paying nothing to obtain. Id. 
Messerly made clear to the mediator that he believed a release of counsel was a normal term 
found in many release agreements (Messerly has provided two example settlement releases 
drafted by other attorneys that included release of counsel). Id. Judge Dunn suddenly claimed he 
was considering making an ethics Complaint against Messerly to Bar Counsel. Id. Judge Dunn’s 
threats caused significant anxiety for Kosmann and Messerly. Id. Judge Dunn also stated that he 
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agreed with Dinius and Dunbar that the release for counsel was requested too late and the parties 
already had a final settlement for $40,000. Id. During this debate about the scope of the mutual 
release, Dinius never asked Kosmann to pay anything for release of his counsel, and Messerly 
and Kosmann specifically discussed that Kosmann would never pay anything for a release that 
was not even for Kosmann, particularly since there was no actual counsel liability to Dinius to 
release. R. Vol. III, p.93, ¶39. Messerly eventually told Kosmann to drop the issue and move 
forward with the existing agreement: settlement for $40,000 and a mutual release that did not 
include counsel. R., Vol. II, p.114-15, ¶¶2-4; Vol. III, pp.61-62, ¶¶3-4; pp.88-90, ¶¶18-32; 
pp.408, ¶5. Messerly told Kosmann that because of the accusations of the release being 
unethical, Messerly would now not accept a release from Dinius even if it was offered. Id.  
Messerly sent Kosmann out of the room to tell Judge Dunn that the mediation had been 
fully resolved based on the existing $40,000 agreement, without a release of counsel. R. Vol. III, 
p.91, ¶33; p.309, ¶¶8-9. The mediation was now over. R. Vol. III, p.215, ¶5. Typically, Messerly 
would convey this final acceptance, but Messerly sent Kosmann because of the repeated 
accusations from Judge Dunn (in front of Kosmann) that Messerly was improperly making the 
decisions rather than Kosmann (an absurd notion by Judge Dunn since it is counsel’s job to give 
Kosmann the best advice about settlement options). Id. 
4. Kosmann Meets Alone With Dinius and Everyone Knows Except Messerly. 
Kosmann told Judge Dunn that he had dropped the release of counsel issue and the case 
was settled for $40,000. R. Vol. II, p.115, ¶5; Vol. II, p.62, ¶5; Vol. III, pp.309-10, ¶¶3-7; p.349-
351, ¶¶4-5, 12. He also asked Judge Dunn if he could speak to Dinius about getting an informal 
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promise that he would not sue Messerly. Id. Kosmann had not discussed this idea with Messerly. 
Id. In fact, during two years since Dinius stopped representing Kosmann in 2015, the two had 
never spoken and all communication from Dinius and Dunbar to Kosmann and vice versa had 
gone through Messerly. Id. Judge Dunn did not tell Messerly (sitting a few feet away behind a 
closed door) about his client’s request. Id. Instead, Judge Dunn took Kosmann’s request to 
Dinius and Dunbar. Id. Neither Judge Dunn, Dinius, nor Dunbar told Kosmann that ex parte 
meetings are not allowed unless his counsel consents. Id. Neither Dinius nor Dunbar asked 
Kosmann or Judge Dunn whether Messerly knew or had consented. Id. Dinius (with Dunbar and 
Judge Dunn’s blessing) met with Kosmann alone (without telling Messerly). Id.   
After approximately 20-25 minutes had passed without Kosmann returning, Messerly 
opened the door to leave their negotiation room, intending to look for his client. R. Vol. II, 
pp.115, ¶5; Vol. III, pp.61-62, ¶¶3-4; pp.91-92, ¶¶33-37; pp.215-16, ¶¶6-8; pp.310-11, ¶¶10-15; 
p.349, ¶¶4-6. Messerly was surprised to discover Judge Dunn leaning against the wall right 
outside the door. Id. Messerly asked Judge Dunn why he was not writing up the final settlement. 
Id. Judge Dunn explained that Kosmann was in a closed room across the hall meeting with 
Dinius. Id. Messerly immediately objected and asked why this was happening. Id. Judge Dunn 
explained that he set it up, that it was to clear the air, and that the $40,000 settlement was already 
final. Id. Messerly stated that a secret meeting between a lawyer and an opposing party during 
mediation was improper, but Judge Dunn said it was proper. Id. Messerly did not know what to 
do (since a Judge was telling him to back off). Id. Before he could decide what to do, Kosmann 
returned, with Judge Dunn accompanying him, and announced that he had reached a new 
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settlement: all the same terms except Dinius would now give the broader release to include a 
release of Messerly in exchange for Kosmann giving up $8,000 of the prior settlement, i.e. 
Kosmann was now just receiving back his approximately $32,000 being held by the Court. Id. 
Messerly immediately objected and indicated that this was improper: a secret meeting 
that Judge Dunn, Dinius, and Dunbar knew about but Messerly did not, the renegotiation of a 
settlement reached hours before, Judge Dunn’s incorrect claim that the meeting was just to “clear 
the air,” and the exchange of $8,000 for a release that minutes earlier Judge Dunn, Dinius, and 
Dunbar had claimed was unethical and that Messerly had said he would not accept and certainly 
would never allow his client to pay for. R. Vol. III, pp.61-62, ¶¶3-4; pp.92-94, ¶¶38-45; p.216, 
¶9; pp.311-13, ¶¶16-19; p.350-52, ¶¶7-13; pp.410-12, ¶¶11-14. Judge Dunn disagreed with 
Messerly and told Kosmann that the new agreement was now the final agreement, eliminating 
the prior settlement. Id. Judge Dunn unequivocally told Kosmann and Messerly that there was 
nothing improper with Dinius meeting with Kosmann without getting Messerly’s consent. Id. 
Messerly insisted that Judge Dunn tell Dinius and Dunbar about the impropriety of their 
unauthorized meeting with Kosmann and demand they stick with the original agreement for 
$40,000. Id. When Judge Dunn returned, he indicated that they had refused and he again agreed 
with them. Id. Judge Dunn told Kosmann and Messerly that he would just put the new agreement 
on the record. Id. He also indicated that Dinius and Dunbar had stated they would file motions to 
have Messerly and Kosmann sanctioned if Kosmann refused to follow through with the new 
agreement (which they subsequently did). Id. Judge Dunn said Messerly would be acting 
improperly if he tried to unwind an agreement already reached between the parties. Id. 
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5. Kosmann Puts New Settlement on Record After Threats by Judge Dunn and Dinius. 
Messerly told Kosmann that he would not accept the release from Dinius and he would 
not support the renegotiated settlement. R. Vol. III, pp.61-62, ¶¶3-4; pp.94-95, ¶¶46-48; p.217, 
¶¶10-12; pp.313-14, ¶¶20-24; p.352-53, ¶¶14-17. Messerly said Kosmann now had two options, 
neither of which were good: (1) ignore Messerly’s advice and give away the $8,000 (in exchange 
for nothing) over Messerly’s stated objections; or (2) let Messerly fight to enforce the original 
settlement agreement and oppose the new terms, knowing it would be a lengthy fight and Judge 
Dunn was going to support the other side. Id. Kosmann was overwhelmed and in tears because of 
the situation. Id. Messerly was angry at the unethical behavior by Dinius, Dunbar and Judge 
Dunn and distraught for his client. Id. Kosmann decided to not fight Judge Dunn, Dinius, or 
Dunbar anymore. Id. Kosmann made this decision based on the misrepresentations by Dinius 
during the secret meeting, Judge Dunn and Dinius’s false claims about the validity of the secret 
meeting, and his fear of the threats that he would go through months more litigation and pay 
sanctions and other fees if he challenged what they had done. Id. 
6. Judge Dunn Admits Orchestrating Secret Meeting; Messerly States His Objection. 
The parties then went on the record. Judge Dunn spoke first: 
… I’ve been mediating the matter with the parties and their representative counsel. 
And they have reached a settlement agreement. The essence of the agreement is that 
for a payment of … $32,047.19 that – to Mr. Kosmann. There will be a complete 
release and dismissal of any and all claims between the parties, each party to bear 
their own costs and fees. … I’ll note for the record that there were, in the last few 
minutes, individualized discussions between the parties, Mr. Kosmann and Mr. 
Dinius, outside the presence of counsel that that discussion led, in part, to this 
agreement. … But the essence of the agreement is for a complete dismissal of all – 
any and all claims. There will be that payment. …  
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Tr. p.2, L. 2:6-3:2. Judge Dunn did not mention the payment going to Dinius, the release of 
Messerly that Dinius had promised to Kosmann, that Judge Dunn arranged those ex parte 
“discussions between the parties,” or that Judge Dunn had purposely not disclosed them to 
Messerly (undoubtedly knowing Messerly would never have consented to it). Id.   
 Messerly then stated an objection to what was happening, 
… this litigation was originally settled, I don’t know, about an hour ago or two hours 
ago for $40,000, … the understanding was my client requested that I be also released 
from all claims, that Mr. Dinius would release me as well as my client from all 
claims. And my client expressed the fact that the reason why he wanted that was 
because he has additional litigation that he’s got ongoing against other parties and 
doesn’t want his lawyer being sued for whatever reason that Mr. Dinius might have. 
And Mr. Dinius had already threatened during the negotiations, through the mediator, 
that an indemnity claim was going to be brought against me and the lawsuit and that 
[Kosmann] wouldn’t be able to have me as his attorney. … In this lawsuit. … And the 
mediator expressed concerns that this was an ethical violation on my behalf. And so I 
had phone conversations with multiple parties. … And Brad Andrews was concerned 
enough that it gave me enough concern that I told my client I don’t want to be on that 
release anymore. …And I told my client, take the $40,000 and don’t put me on the 
release. That’s the agreement that had been said many times by the mediator that that 
was what was the agreement. So I said take that deal. I sent him out of the room to go 
take that deal, to go speak to the mediator. Next thing I know, I – half an hour later, I 
went out to go see what was going on, why he hadn’t come back, and I learned that he 
was having communications directly with Mr. Dinius. And then he came back in to 
tell me that he’d settled the agreement – settled the lawsuit for $32,000, giving away 
$8,000 that he’d already settled for. And he explained that the reason he got that 
lesser amount was because he got some sort of personal promise from Kevin Dinius 
that Kevin Dinius would not sue me in any way. So in other words, even though 
Kevin Dinius had … throughout the entire mediation, alleged that I was acting 
unethically by supposedly me forcing my client to ask for this release, now when he 
gets in the room with [Kosmann], he gets [Kosmann] to agree that he’ll give up 
$8,000 in exchange for that exact same promise. … And now [Kosmann] has $8,000 
less. … I have grave concern about this because I wasn’t there and I would never 
have allowed – I would never have counseled him – he didn’t ask me. … And I am 
shocked that Mr. Dinius would ask for that benefit when he had specifically said that 
he had all those concerns about that being an ethical violation. … I, of course, can’t 
enforce that promise. If I tried to enforce that promise, there would be an ethical 
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violation, as I’ve been told over and over and over again today.… Dave Kosmann 
gave up $8,000 for nothing. And it was all done in personal negotiations directly with 
Mr. Dinius without my involvement.…       
Id. pp.2-3: 4:13-7:19. Messerly’s statement reflects his anger with: how an existing settlement 
had been renegotiated without his knowledge or involvement, how Kosmann was receiving 
$8,000 less in exchange for nothing, and how Dinius manipulated his ex-client by claiming a 
trivial attorney release was unethical but then changed his tune when he had Kosmann alone. 
Messerly would have said more but he had only a few minutes to prepare and was unsure how to 
contest unethical conduct by a judge who had personally threatened Messerly during the 
mediation. R.Vol. III, p.412, ¶14 (“I was clearly holding back much of what I wanted to say 
because of my fear of crossing a District Judge.”). Kosmann then stated,  
 It is my hope to be done today. And I want to move forward with my life. I feel 
comfortable with the agreement that I made with Kevin just from man to man, 
besides all the legal stuff. Would I prefer having more money? Yes. But I also want 
my peace of mind. And I want to continue with my lawyer, Loren, to go on to the 
litigation that I have ahead of me. And I want bygones to be bygones between Kevin 
and I so that we can end on good terms and we can – we can both move on with our 
lives. This did not end the way we wanted it to end today. But from just man to man, 
today was the day that, you know, it’s time to move on and be done. And I’m happy 
with it. Loren has to protect himself for those types of things. I want him to protect 
himself. Probably didn’t do what he asked. But I’m doing this for my own accord 
because today is the day to move forward. 
Id. p.3: 8:5-23. This statement does not show how Kosmann was in tears because of his position: 
caught between his attorney who was angrily arguing this was completely unethical and Judge 
Dunn, Dinius, and Dunbar who were claiming it was totally valid and stating that Kosmann 
would face more litigation, sanctions, and fees if he failed to capitulate. Kosmann’s statement 
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shows his continued incorrect belief (based on legal advice by Dinius during the secret meeting) 
that there would be a release of Messerly -- Messerly had just stated he would not accept it. Id. 
7. Dinius and Dunbar Admit $40,000 Settlement and Unauthorized Communications. 
Dunbar then admitted the prior, finalized $40,000 settlement:  
when the $40,000 agreement was made, Mr. – the potential of releasing Mr. Messerly 
had never been discussed at that point in time. We had an agreement. And then after 
the fact is when there was a demand for Mr. Messerly to be on the agreement.  
Id. p.3: 9:15-24 (emphasis added). She tried to excuse the secret meeting: “We weren’t aware 
that Mr. Messerly didn’t know his client and my client were actually going to sit down and talk,” 
id. p.4: 10:4-8, but she did not apologize or offer to proceed with the agreement she admitted was 
reached prior to the ex parte meeting. Id. pp.2-4. Judge Dunn then chimed in to support Dunbar:  
That’s right. You didn’t know that. It was a request by Mr. Kosmann to visit with Mr. 
Dinius. I came in and asked Mr. Dinius to at least have a conversation with him. All he 
had to do was get in a room and converse with him because that was Mr. Kosmann’s 
request. And so I allowed them to do that because clients can meet if they wish.  
Id. p.4: 10:9-16. It is unclear whether this is a common practice for Judge Dunn: assisting 
represented clients in communicating without the protection of their counsel and without telling 
counsel that the Court is facilitating such meetings. This practice would be highly improper. See 
Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), Rule 1.2 (Promoting 
Confidence in the Judiciary), Rule 2.2 (Impartiality), and Rule 2.9 (Ex Parte Communications).  
 Dinius also claimed he had no idea that Messerly was unaware of the secret meeting: “I 
had no idea that Mr. Kosmann had asked to meet with me without Mr. Messerly’s knowledge of 
that.” Id. p.4: 10:20-22. So, both Dinius and Dunbar used the same excuse: they did not realize 
(because they did not ask) Messerly was unaware of the meeting. Neither of them argued that 
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they did it because Dinius was a party and did not need Messerly’s permission (only Judge Dunn 
made this argument) or because Dinius had an attorney and therefore was not bound by the 
Runsvold holding (an after-the-fact argument they now rely upon). Id. pp.2-4. Dinius then also 
admitted the $40,000 agreement: “At no point prior to after having reached that initial – what we 
thought was the agreement of $40,000 – did I have any understanding that Mr. Messerly wanted 
to be included in the release.” Id. p.4: 10:22-25. Dinius also tried to explain why it was suddenly 
okay for him to give a release that he had previously claimed was unethical: 
 I did not raise any ethical issues with that until that time at which point I too 
spoke with Brad Andrews. And Brad walked me through the process by which that 
could have been and can be, which I’ve agreed with [Kosmann] to do, and avoid any 
impropriety under our rules of professional conduct. … in compliance with Rule 1.7 
that [Kosmann] … understands that there is a potential conflict with Mr. Messerly’s 
release in the context it was portrayed to us or conveyed. … as long as he knowingly 
understands that as a potential for conflict, he can …, by way of informed consent, 
agree to waive that conflict. When [Kosmann] and I met, [Kosmann] and I have not 
directly spoke since about July of 2015. [Kosmann] and I cleared the air. The terms of 
the agreement were modified consistent with the discussion that he and I had … in 
clearing the air and trying to restore the friendship that he and I had before .… 
Id. p.4: 11:1-25. Dinius, thus, admitted using the meeting to: give legal advice to Kosmann about 
the release, use his prior attorney-client relationship with Kosmann to manipulate Kosmann, and 
obtain a conflict of interest waiver on behalf of Messerly (as if that were possible). Id. Dinius has 
not explained what claims against Messerly he gave up. There were none.  
After the mediation, Messerly interviewed Kosmann more closely regarding what was 
said during the ex parte meeting and learned that Dinius also told Kosmann: (1) Messerly 
committed malpractice; (2) he would have protected Kosmann in the Gilbride appeal and related 
litigation but for Messerly causing all the litigation between Kosmann and Dinius; and (3) 
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Messerly is a hot head. R.Vol. III, p.93, ¶40. In sum, the meeting was exactly the dishonest 
attorney manipulation (of an ex-client no less) that is supposed to be prohibited by IRPC 4.2.     
8. Dunbar’s Proposed Settlement Agreement. 
 Shortly after mediation, Dunbar sent a proposed settlement agreement that stated Dinius 
would receive $15,000 (the first disclosure of Dinius’s payment) and tried to revise history:  
The Defendants also herein agree not to pursue any indemnification claims 
against Kosmann’s current counsel, Loren Messerly, with regard to Kosmann’s claim 
that the Defendants failed to timely file litigation against real estate agent Justin 
McCarthy. Kosmann represents his understanding that the inclusion of his current 
counsel in this Agreement creates a potential conflict of interest between him and 
Messerly; that the potential conflict was fully explained to him by Messerly; that he 
consents to waiving any potential conflict …  
R.Vol. III, p.26, ¶3, p.27, ¶5. Dunbar’s language says Messerly “fully explained” an alleged 
conflict of interest to Kosmann and received his waiver, even though she knew it was Dinius, not 
Messerly, who claimed to have had those conflict and waiver discussions with Kosmann during 
the secret meeting. Tr. p.4, L. 11:1-25; R. Vol. III, p.97, ¶57. The statement claiming Messerly 
failed to timely file litigation against McCarthy was particularly specious considering Messerly 
did bring the lawsuit (that Dinius failed to bring) and received a significant settlement from 
McCarthy for Kosmann. R. Vol. III, p.407, ¶3. Dunbar also included a signature line for 
Messerly to approve the document even though Messerly had objected on the record. Id., p.30.  
C. Statement of Procedural History. 
1. Initial Cross-Motions to Enforce Two Different Settlements. 
 On August 2, 2017, Dunbar filed a motion to compel enforcement of the settlement 
agreement that had been put on the record on July 26, 2017. R. Vol. II, p.110. The next day, 
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Messerly filed a cross-motion to enforce the initial settlement agreement for $40,000. Id., p.112. 
Fulfilling their threat from the mediation, Dinius and Dunbar immediately retaliated and filed a 
memorandum seeking sanctions under I.C. §12-121 and IRCP 11(c) against Kosmann and 
Messerly for challenging the $32,000 settlement. Id., pp.17-18. This was the first of seven 
different briefs where Dinius and Dunbar sought retaliatory sanctions against Messerly and 
Kosmann. R. Vol. III, p.187-89; pp.206-07; pp. 268-69; pp. 277-87 (seeking approximately 50 
hours of fees, i.e. $10,000 or more, to be paid as sanction); pp. 327-32; pp. 463-64.  
 The affidavits filed by Messerly and Kosmann detailed the improper actions of Dinius, 
Dunbar, and Judge Dunn during the mediation. R. Vol. III, pp. 61-2, 83-98. Messerly’s affidavit 
also noted that this was putting his career at risk, since he was pointing out to one judge the 
improper actions by another judge. Id., p.79, ¶59; see ICJC, 2.15 (Responding to Judicial and 
Lawyer Misconduct) (“Taking action to address known misconduct is a judge’s obligation.”); 
Rule 2.16(B) (“A judge shall not retaliate, directly or indirectly, against a person known or 
suspected to have assisted or cooperated with an investigation of a judge or a lawyer.”). Dinius 
and Dunbar submitted declarations wherein they: again admitted not telling Messerly about the 
ex parte meeting; continued to accuse Messerly of unethical actions regarding Kosmann’s initial 
request for a release of counsel; admitted the settlement for $40,000; accused Messerly of 
malpractice by letting a statute of limitation run; and tried to blame Kosmann. R. Vol. III, 
pp.190-97; 198-202. Dinius and Dunbar were completely unapologetic:  
[N]either I nor my client [Dinius] had any duty to confirm whether Mr. Messerly was 
aware that his client repeatedly asked the mediator to speak with Mr. Dinius or that 
the parties were going to meet at his client’s request.… [IRPC] 4.2 only precludes an 
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attorney from communicating with a represented opposing party where the attorney is 
representing his or her client during such communication. It does not preclude an 
attorney-party from communicating directly with a represented opposing party.  
Id., pp. 195-96, ¶¶ 13 & 15. That statement is completely contrary to Rule 4.2 and Runsvold.  
2. The Initial Hearing on the Cross-Motions to Enforce Two Different Settlements. 
 The District Court heard the cross-motions on August 31, 2017. Messerly expecting the 
Court to be unhappy with Dinius and Dunbar for meeting secretly with an opposing party during 
a Court-ordered mediation to obtain a better settlement than what had already been agreed upon 
and for refusing to just remedy the situation by paying the additional $8,000 they had already 
agreed to pay. Tr. pp.7-8, L. 12:12-21, 14:3-7; see ICJC, Rule 2.15 (“Ignoring or denying known 
misconduct among one’s judicial colleagues or members of the legal profession undermines a 
judge’s responsibility to participate in efforts to ensure public respect for the legal system.”). 
Instead, the District Court had no questions for Dinius and Dunbar about their unauthorized 
contact with a represented party.1 Tr. pp. 5-11. The District Court’s only substantive questions 
                                                 
1 The Court never asked any of the obvious questions, including: what was their normal 
procedure when a represented party contacted them; why they were sure during the mediation 
that Dinius could speaking with Kosmann alone; had they ever had secret contacts with 
represented parties before; if they thought the contact was okay, why hadn’t Dinius spoken with 
Kosmann earlier in the case; why they hadn’t asked Kosmann about Messerly’s consent; why 
they hadn’t knocked on Messerly’s door to find out if he consented and in order to be cautious; 
whether Dinius, Dunbar and/or Judge Dunn discussed whether to get Messerly’s consent; why 
they assumed Messerly would be okay with letting them meet alone with his client; why they 
believed including counsel in the mutual release was unethical; why, during negotiations with 
opposing counsel, they never offered to trade the release of counsel for money but did make that 
offer once they had Kosmann alone; whether Dinius believed that his prior attorney-client 
relationship with Kosmann provided him with an advantage in convincing Kosmann to change 
the settlement; what exactly was said during the secret meeting; what legitimate claims Dinius 
had against Messerly that were worth $8,000 to Kosmann; why Dinius bad mouthed an opposing 
lawyer to that lawyer’s client; what legal advice Dinius gave to an opposing party without 
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were directed at Messerly, arguing that the plain language of IRPC 4.2 allowed Dinius to have 
the secret meeting with Kosmann (the argument rejected by Runsvold): “Mr. Dinius in this case 
was a client. He’s not representing a client.” Tr. p.7, L. 10:1-7.   
 Stunned by the District Court’s approach of defending the unauthorized communications, 
Messerly immediately filed a short supplemental brief and declaration from Kosmann to respond 
to the Court’s comments and fact questions. R. Vol. II, pp.114-126. Messerly inadvertently did 
not file a separate motion for leave to file supplemental briefing. Messerly’s normal practice is to 
request leave if he files supplemental materials. Tr. pp.40-41; R. Vol. III, p.316, ¶31. In fact, 
previously in this same case, Messerly filed supplemental materials after a hearing and he filed a 
motion for leave. R. Vol. III, p.25 (2/28/17 Motion). 
3. Dinius’s Motion to Strike and For Sanctions That Does Not Comply with Rule 11. 
Without warning, six days later on September 5, 2017, Dinius and Dunbar filed a motion 
to strike Kosmann’s supplemental filings and said they were improperly filed without a separate 
motion requesting leave to file. R. Vol. III, pp.203-08. Dinius and Dunbar asked the Court to 
sanction Kosmann and Messerly under Rule 11 for this alleged procedural error of not filing the 
separate motion for leave. Id. Prior to filing their motion to strike, Dinius and Dunbar did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
opposing counsel knowing; why they did not return to the original settlement once they knew 
Messerly was unaware of the secret renegotiations and was objecting; why they believed they 
could sell the release of counsel to Kosmann for $8,000 even after they learned Messerly would 
not accept it; whether they had done any subsequent research after the mediation to confirm they 
were allowed to have this unauthorized contact; why it was not already a settlement for $40,000 
when Kosmann went to Judge Dunn and said he was dropping the release issue; and whether it 
might make more sense to pay the $8,000 rather than expend thousands in fees to try to prove 
they did nothing wrong.  
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contact Messerly to point out any alleged procedural error nor did they provide the required 21-
day notice. R. Vol. III, p.316, ¶31; see IRCP 11(c)(2) (“The motion must be served under Rule 5, 
but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, 
contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days ….”). Messerly 
immediately fixed any error, filing a motion for leave two days later on September 7th. R. Vol. 
III, pp.208-18. Also on September 7th, Messerly sent Dunbar an email stating that Plaintiff would 
waive fees and the litigation could be resolved if they would just pay the additional $8,000. R. 
Vol. III, p. 315, ¶26-27, p.415-416, ¶24, & p.423. Dunbar and Dinius never responded. 
4. Kosmann Seeks Sanctions Based on Idaho Runsvold Case That Is Controlling Law. 
On September 14, 2017, the Court set the matter for another hearing on October 2nd. R. 
Vol. III, p.6. In preparation for that hearing, Messerly did more research on IRPC 4.2 and found 
that Idaho had a case directly on point that rejected the Court’s statements during the last 
hearing: Dinius was not allowed to meet secretly with a represented party even if Dinius was not 
representing anyone other than himself. See Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 421, 
925 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1996). It is unclear whether Dinius and Dunbar were aware of this 
controlling Idaho case law. They had not disclosed it, which suggests they were unaware of it 
and had not even adequately researched their own excuse to get around Rule 4.2.   
Messerly immediately drafted a motion for sanctions relying on Idaho’s long-standing 
Runsvold controlling precedent; he finished it and filed and served it on September 20th, two 
days short of the normal fourteen days prior to the existing hearing date of October 2nd, so he 
also filed a motion to shorten time and proposed order and stipulated that Dinius would have the 
 
21 
full seven days to respond. R. Vol. III, pp.6-7, 236. Dinius opposed the motion to shorten time. 
R. Vol. II, pp.127-32. However, on September 27th, Dinius filed an opposition brief, with two 
additional affidavits. R. Vol. III, pp.238-69. Dinius called the brief a “Supplemental Reply In 
Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement,” which was highly ironic and inconsistent since he did 
not file a motion for leave to file supplemental materials. Id. The new affidavits from Dinius and 
Dunbar were an attempt to protect against the Runsvold decision: claiming Dinius was never 
acting pro se (even though he met alone with Kosmann to negotiate a settlement and Dunbar 
claimed no involvement), arguing it was reasonable to assume that Messerly had okayed the 
meeting, and blaming Messerly (“[T]he standard practice during mediations is for an attorney to 
remain with his client during any and all communications with the mediator. Otherwise, the 
attorney is leaving his client unrepresented with an individual, the mediator, whose job it is to 
convince the client to change his expectations and position and settle.”). Id. 
5. Court’s Oral Ruling to Sanction Messerly and Kosmann. 
At the October 2nd hearing, the Court denied the motion to shorten time, without giving a 
reason, and only addressed Kosmann’s motion for leave to file supplemental materials and 
Dinius’s motion to strike. Tr. pp.27-38. The Court granted Kosmann’s motion for leave and 
allowed Dunbar time to file responsive supplemental materials. Id. Shockingly, the Court also 
stated that it would impose a monetary sanction upon Kosmann and Messerly for failing to 
initially file the motion for leave. Tr. p.38, L. 16:13-22. Messerly immediately saw the retaliatory 
purpose of this unheard-of sanction: “… they violate the rules, and I bring it to your attention, 
and your approach is to award attorneys fees to them?” Id., L. 17:10-13. 
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On October 5, 2017, the Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Materials. R. Vol. II, 136-40. The Order concluded, “The Court noted at the 
hearing that it intended to award fees incurred in filing and prosecuting Dinius’s Motion to 
Strike. However, because Dinius did not file his request for fees in a separate motion as required 
by Rule 11(c)(2), no fees shall be awarded.” Id., p.140. In other words, the Court noted that 
Dinius and Dunbar made their own procedural error in their motion asking for sanctions for a 
procedural error. The Court failed to note the more important error: Dinius and Dunbar also erred 
in not following the mandatory 21-day service and notice requirement in Rule 11(c)(2).   
On October 17th, Kosmann re-noticed his Motion for Sanctions for a November 8th 
hearing. R. Vol. III, pp.7-8. Predictably, on October 25th, Dinius filed his own retaliatory Motion 
for Sanctions, which included a renewed request for sanctions based on the August 31st failure to 
file a separate motion for leave and a request for sanctions because Kosmann and Messerly dared 
to challenge the Rule 4.2 violation. R. Vol. III, pp.274-87. Defendants sought monetary sanctions 
for approximately 50 hours of fees, i.e. $10,000-$14,000 at $200-280 an hour. Id. Dinius and 
Dunbar were again fulfilling the threat made during the mediation when they told Kosmann they 
would sue him for monetary sanctions if he did not go through with the renegotiated settlement.  
6. In First Ruling, the Court Rejects Runsvold and Enforces the New Settlement. 
On November 3rd, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement and Order to Release Funds (“Nov. 3rd Order”). R. Vol. II, pp.142-160. 
As would be its consistent approach, the District Court’s analysis ignored most of the arguments 
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raised by Kosmann. Regarding the key issue of ethical violations by Dinius and Dunbar during 
mediation, the Court remarkably claimed this was an issue of first impression in Idaho:  
Had Dinius been representing himself pro se in this matter, under existing Idaho 
precedent Rule 4.2 would have prohibited his communication with Kosmann. … 
However Runsvold did not address the particular fact scenario presented here—
whether an attorney, who is a party to a lawsuit and represented by counsel, may 
speak to a represented, non-attorney opposing party. … 
…. 
This is a matter of first impression in Idaho. In Runsvold, the Court recognized 
that ignoring a pro se attorney-litigant’s status as an attorney would frustrate the 
intent of Rule 4.2, because the opposing party “would lose the protection a 
represented person has achieved by obtaining counsel.” … The Court also notes, 
however, that because Idaho courts have not previously addressed the precise issue, 
Dinius’s counsel had a good faith basis to believe that the contact between Dinius and 
Kosmann was appropriate based on the text of Rule 4.2, comment 2 to Rule 4.2, and 
the rationale articulated by the South Carolina Bar and Connecticut Supreme Court.  
Whether Dinius’s meeting with Kosmann violated Rule 4.2 is not clearly settled 
under Idaho law.  
Id., pp.156-58. This analysis was rife with errors. The Court did not explain: how Runsvold was 
not controlling despite Dinius doing the exact thing that attorney Runsvold had been sanctioned 
for doing; how Dinius was not pro se despite renegotiating the settlement with Kosmann alone; 
or how the explicit policy reasons driving the Runsvold ruling were inapplicable to this case 
(they are obviously applicable). Id. The District Court’s discussion also implies that any Idaho 
attorney-party can in “good faith” get around the ethical rules and protections for represented 
parties by merely putting another attorney on the pleadings (which is non-sensical). Id. Lastly, 
the District Court incorrectly relied upon cases from other jurisdictions, e.g. the Pinsky case, that 
were specifically rejected by the Runsvold court and are therefore irrelevant. Id.  
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The District Court then ruled it would enforce the renegotiated settlement regardless of 
whether it arose out of unethical conduct because Kosmann put it on the record. Id., pp.152-53. 
To support the fiction that the unethical actions had no impact on the ultimate settlement put on 
the record, the Court ignored all contrary facts in the record and did not even mention them. Id. 
In remarkable contrast, the District Judge needed five pages of analysis to resolve Dinius and 
Dunbar’s frivolous claim that Messerly and Kosmann should be sanctioned. Id., pp. 153-58. The 
Court failed to point out how Dinius and Dunbar were abusing Rule 11 sanctions. Id.  
7. Court Sanctions Kosmann and Not Dinius. 
On November 22, 2017, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Parties’ Cross-Motions for Sanctions (“Nov. 22 Order”) that found:  
 neither Dinius nor Dunbar would be sanctioned for their secret meeting with 
Kosmann because IRPC 4.2 and the Runsvold case were somehow inapplicable; 
 even if it had found a violation, the Court could do nothing because “district courts do 
not have authority to sanction attorneys for violations of the professional rules”; and 
 Kosmann and Messerly were monetarily sanctioned, pursuant to Rule 11, for not 
filing a separate Motion for Leave on August 31, 2017.  
R. Vol. II, pp. 162-76. As to the first bullet, the Court again refused to acknowledge or address 
any of Messerly’s arguments about why the Court could not distinguish Runsvold. Id., pp.166-
70. As to the second bullet, the District Court did not cite case law to support that conclusion, it 
ignored cases from every possible jurisdiction where courts enforce rules of professional 
conduct, and it provided no explanation for why attorneys would be allowed to violate ethical 
rules to obtain more favorable resolutions of a lawsuit and the court would be unable to remedy 
it. Id., pp.170-71. As to the third bullet, the Court reversed course again to award the retaliatory 
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sanctions requested by Dinius and Dunbar. R. Vol. II, pp.173-74. As always, the District Court 
did not cite case law to support these monetary sanctions. Id. Messerly and Kosmann interpreted 
this second sanction award as the District Court’s newest attempt to intimidate and bully them 
for raising allegations of unethical behavior by Judge Dunn, Dinius and Dunbar.  See ICJC, Rule 
2.16(B) (“A judge shall not retaliate, directly or indirectly, against a person known or suspected 
to have assisted or cooperated with an investigation of a judge or a lawyer.”). 
The District Court’s Nov. 22nd Order ignored the overarching injustice of the case: Dinius 
and Dunbar committed a major ethical violation, with an Idaho case directly on point, directly 
resulting in $8,000 in damages and thousands of attorney fees, and the Court claimed it both 
would not and could not remedy the issue; in contrast, Messerly committed a trivial procedural 
error that was fixed two days after it was raised, causing no damages, and the Court awarded a 
monetary sanction without any legal support. The District Court issued its Judgment on 
November 22, 2017, that ordered Kosmann to pay $200 to Defendants for his sanction and 
ordered the payment of the $32,000 settlement funds to Kosmann (his own money) and $15,000 
to Dinius. R. Vol. II, pp.178-79. Messerly paid the $200 sanction to Dinius.       
8. Motion to Reconsider Filed to Correct Numerous Errors. 
On December 5th, Kosmann filed a timely Motion to Reconsider, hoping to avoid the 
delay and cost of this appeal. R. Vol. III, pp.344-345; IRCP 59(e). Almost everything the District 
Court had done in the case had been contrary to law and common sense. In addition, the Court 
had written opinions that mostly ignored the correct arguments raised by Messerly, something 
Messerly had never experienced at any time in his fifteen years in the law. Messerly requested a 
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hearing date on the Motion to Reconsider and on December 11th, the District Court issued its 
Order that set a hearing for January 11, 2018, and did not set a briefing schedule. R. Vol. III, p.9; 
Supp.R. p.21. Messerly followed the briefing rules for any motion: the memorandum in support 
and declarations must be filed no later than fourteen days prior to the hearing. See IRCP 
7(b)(3)(A) & (D). Messerly believed the memorandum and additional declaration were due on 
December 27th, so he filed them early on December 24th. R. Vol. III, p.9. Dunbar filed a motion 
to strike those two filings because they were not filed within fourteen days of the November 22nd 
Judgment. R. Vol. III, pp.427-43. After reading the cases in the motion to strike, Messerly 
believed he erred in the timing but he asked the Court to still consider the memorandum and 
declaration that were filed based on a good faith understanding of the procedural timing rules, 
did not create any prejudice to Dinius and Dunbar, and contained arguments and additional facts 
that could help the Court to avoid erroneous legal rulings. Id., pp.445-52.  
9. Court Refuses to Reconsider Any of Its Rulings.   
On January 24, 2018, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Defendants’ Second Motion to Strike. R. Vol. II, pp.181-
95. In its ruling, the Court again did not address most of the correct arguments raised by 
Kosmann. Id. The Court said that the memorandum and declaration filed on December 24, 2017, 
would not be considered because Messerly admitted he misunderstood the timing schedule and 
filed them late. Id., pp.183-85. That was apparently the Court’s only relevant consideration. Id. 
The Court also stated, “This is the second time in this case that Plaintiff has filed untimely 
documents without first filing a motion for leave,” which is an illogical statement since Messerly 
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did not know his documents were untimely when he filed them, and he was unable to transport 
himself back in time to file a motion for leave. Id., p.185. Such obviously specious and falsely 
accusatory comments from the Court against Messerly are further reason why Messerly lost any 
belief that the Court was acting as a neutral and fair-minded decision maker in this case.  
The District Court then restated its prior arguments, ignoring Kosmann’s arguments. For 
example, the Court did not acknowledge its error in claiming it lacked authority to enforce the 
Rules of Professional Conduct; instead, the Court reached its same desired result by “exercising 
its discretion” to not enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id., p.194. As another example, 
the Court reiterated its Rule 11 sanction of Messerly and Kosmann without even mentioning the 
approximately fifteen reasons given for why its sanction was improper. Id., pp.194-95; see IRCP 
11(c)(2). On February 2, 2018, Kosmann filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. Vol. II, pp.197-205.  
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL  
 
1.  Whether the District Court’s erred in finding the Runsvold holding distinguishable and 
Dinius’s ex parte meeting with Kosmann during the mediation was not a violation of IRPC 4.2. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to remedy the damages from the ethical 
violations, including voiding the renegotiated settlement and awarding monetary damages of the 
lost $8,000 in settlement funds and all reasonable attorney fees incurred proving the violations. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in finding that, regardless of a violation of IRPC 4.2, 
the renegotiated settlement for $32,000 (and not the $40,000 settlement) would be enforced. 
5. Whether the District Court erred in sanctioning Kosmann and Messerly for a minor 
procedural error that was immediately remedied and/or in failing to sanction Dinius and Dunbar 
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for repeatedly requesting sanctions in bad faith and for retaliatory purposes. 
6. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to consider certain filings 
related to the motion to reconsider. 
 7. Whether Appellant’s appellate fees should be awarded pursuant to the settlement 
agreement contract Dinius sought to enforce, pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, and/or as a remedy for 
Dinius’s ethical violation that he refused to remedy and instead forced Kosmann to litigate. 
III. ARGUMENT 
 
A. Standard of Review of District Court’s Rulings.  
The issue of whether unauthorized contact between Dinius and a represented party is a 
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct is a question of law reviewed de novo. How 
to remedy attorney violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct is typically discretionary, 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision how to sanction attorneys for alleged violations of 
Rule 11 is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion. However, whether the moving party 
complied with the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 is a question of law reviewed de novo. 
The decision of whether to consider a filing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
B. District Court Refused to Follow Controlling Authority Finding IRPC 4.2 Violation.  
One of the District Court’s most glaring errors of law was its steadfast refusal to apply 
binding Idaho precedent from this Court, the Runsvold case. Attorney Runsvold was sanctioned 
for doing the same thing Dinius did in this case: communicating with the other represented party 
without first obtaining the consent of opposing counsel. The Idaho Supreme Court, relying upon 
common sense and the purposes of the rule, could not have been clearer in rejecting any loophole 
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that would allow such actions by an attorney who was also a party:  
Runsvold argues that Rule 4.2 does not explicitly prohibit a pro se attorney from 
communicating directly with a represented opposing party. He claims that since an 
attorney proceeding pro se is “not representing a client,” … citing Pinsky v. Statewide 
Grievance Committee, …. 
In the present case, we hold that a pro se lawyer/litigant does represent a client 
when representing himself or herself in a matter; thus, I.R.P.C. 4.2 applies to prevent 
the pro se attorney from directly contacting a represented opposing party. The 
purpose of the identical ABA Model Rule 4.2 has been explained as follows: 
Rule 4.2 prevents a lawyer from nullifying the protection a represented person has 
achieved by retaining counsel. According to Rule 4.2, therefore, Lawyer A may 
not speak to Lawyer B's client about “the subject of the representation,” except 
under circumstances controlled by Lawyer B. 
If Runsvold's position that he must be treated only as a party and that his status as an 
attorney should be ignored is accepted, the intent of I.R.P.C. 4.2 would be frustrated. 
His ex-wife would lose “the protection a represented person has achieved by 
obtaining counsel,” and her attorney would lose the ability to control access to his 
client, a fundamental element of the attorney-client relationship. 
 
That ruling has been law for all Idaho lawyers since 1996.2 The District Court, however, 
                                                 
2 Idaho’s Runsvold decision helped establish the clear majority rule on this issue. See, e.g., 
Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Cameron, 958 N.E.2d 138, 140–42 (Ohio 2011); In re Disciplinary 
Action Against Lucas, 789 N.W.2d 73, 77–78 (N.D. 2010); In re Haley, 126 P.3d 1262 (Wash. 
2006); In re Discipline of Schaefer, 25 P.3d 191, 198–200 (Nev. 2001); Fishelson v. Skorupa, 
No. CIV.A 2001-3173-A, 2001 WL 888369, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 31, 2001); Sprauve v. 
Mastromonico, 86 F. Supp. 2d 519, 530 (D.V.I. 1999) (“The plaintiff is an attorney whenever he 
appears before the Court, the public, or the mirror”); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 
108–09 (Wyo. 1994); Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032–33 (N.Y. 1990); Siguel v. 
Trustees of Tufts Coll., 1990 WL 29199, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 1990); Comm. on Legal 
Ethics v. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1990); In re Glass, 784 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Or. 1990); 
S.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 11-01 (2011); 39 Md. B.J. 57 (2006); Haw. Disciplinary Bd., Formal Op. 44 
(2003); D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. 258 (1995); Mich. Bar, Ethics Op. CI-1206 (1988).  
It is supported by policies going back at least a century. See, e.g., ABA Canon of 
Professional Ethics, Canon 9 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical 
Consideration 7-18 (1969); Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983), Rule 4.2, cmt. 1 (“This 
Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has 
chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers 
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apparently disagreed with that ruling, refusing to do the obvious and rule that Dinius (with 
assistance from Dunbar and Judge Dunn) had violated Rule 4.2. See State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 
314, 325, 271 P.3d 712, 723 (2012) (“[W]e … remind trial judges that they do not have the 
liberty to consciously disregard the principles of law articulated by the appellate courts of this 
state.”); Robinson v. Mueller, 156 Idaho 237, 242, 322 P.3d 319, 324 (Ct. App. 2014) (similar). It 
appears the District Court would not make this ruling because it did not want to implicate Judge 
Dunn in the ethics violation. See ICJC, Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law) & Rule 2.15. 
 Instead, the District Court found one factual distinction -- attorney Runsvold had no 
attorney of record but Dinius did --and claimed this made it an issue of first impression. Neither 
Dinius, Dunbar, nor Judge Dunn had used this excuse at the time of the mediation or during their 
initial briefings on the issue. Rather, this was an after-the-fact argument raised by Dinius, 
Dunbar, and the District Court once they realized that the Runsvold case was right on point. The 
District Court could not articulate any reason why this one factual difference made the Runsvold 
decision inapplicable. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1169–80 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that precedent can only be distinguished based on “material” facts and only on a 
“principled basis” after detailed analysis of the “reason and spirit of the cases” and more). The 
District Court could not explain how the policy language from Runsvold was inapplicable when 
an attorney-party has hired an attorney. Kosmann is not aware of any case from any jurisdiction 
doing what the District Court did in this case, i.e. applying the no-contact rule to attorney-parties 
                                                                                                                                                             
who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer 




who are pro se but not to attorney-parties who hire an attorney. Kosmann is aware of a case 
rejecting that non-sensical distinction. See Vickery v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 
241, 258–60 (Tex. App. 1999) (“[W]e hold that an attorney's designation of counsel of record 
does not, as a matter of law, preclude the application of Rule 4.02(a) to his actions in contacting 
an opposing party.”). Kosmann filed numerous briefs pointing out many reasons why the Court 
was not properly distinguishing the controlling authority. The District Court did not explain why 
those arguments were wrong; it just ignored those arguments.  
Were this loophole to become the law of Idaho, every attorney-party would hire a lawyer 
to get around Runsvold and communicate directly with the opposing party to negotiate a more 
favorable settlement. For that crucial policy reason alone, this Court should reverse. See G. 
HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 41.02 (4th ed. 2017) (“Model 
Rule 4.2 prevents a lawyer from taking advantage of a lay person … to achieve an 
unconscionable settlement of a dispute.”) (emphasis added). The starting point in this case is 
recognizing that Dinius (with Dunbar’s assistance) violated IRPC 4.2. It is legal error for the 
District Court to ignore binding legal precedent from this Court and also all the policies of Rule 
4.2. This Court should reverse the District Court and confirm that Runsvold already conclusively 
resolved the ethical issue that an attorney cannot have unauthorized communications with the 
opposing party even if the attorney is also a party in the lawsuit and that legal conclusion does 
not change (has no reason to change) if the attorney-party hires an attorney. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion. 
 Once a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is recognized, the Court has 
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discretion to decide the proper sanction and/or remedy of the damages caused by the attorney’s 
violation. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320, 322–23, 144 P.3d 25, 27–28 (2006); Talbot v. 
Ames Const., 127 Idaho 648, 651–53, 904 P.2d 560, 563–65 (1995); see also ABA 
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 420 (Ellen J. Bennett et 
al., 7th ed. 2011) (“As a practical matter, violation of Rule 4.2 occurring in the course of a civil 
proceeding are generally addressed by the court hearing the proceeding; courts have ordered 
evidentiary remedies, return of documents, monetary sanctions, and even disqualifications.”). To 
suggest otherwise (as the District Court initially incorrectly ruled, see R. Vol. II, pp.170-71) 
would be to suggest that Idaho courts are powerless to fully deter violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and powerless to do equity to remedy violations impacting their cases. 
1. District Court’s Bases For Not Remedying the Violation Abused Its Discretion. 
Here, the District Court abused its discretion by not only imposing no sanctions but then 
even giving its judicial blessing to the violations by enforcing the renegotiated settlement that 
was the “fruit” of the ethical violation. The District Court gave three reasons for these decisions: 
no clear ethical violation occurred; Kosmann voluntarily choose the renegotiated settlement 
despite any violations; and the Idaho Bar should resolve the issue rather than the Court. These 
reasons are highly flawed and/or unsupported by the factual record, i.e. an abuse of discretion. 
 First, as discussed above, the Runsvold case is not distinguishable and no attorney can 
claim good faith by violating its holding. See, e.g., Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 83.5 (“[a]ll members 
of the bar ... must familiarize themselves with and comply with the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Idaho State Bar and the decisions of any court interpreting such rules.”). There is 
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no Idaho case law suggesting Dinius could have ex parte negotiations with Kosmann without 
first confirming that Messerly consented.  
 Second, Kosmann did not voluntarily choose the $32,000 settlement rather than the 
$40,000 settlement. Kosmann, like any reasonable person, wanted more money, not less. 
Kosmann provided sworn testimony, corroborated by Messerly, that the only reason he put the 
$32,000 settlement on the record was because he was told by Judge Dunn, Dinius, and Dunbar 
that: no violation had occurred, they would not allow him to proceed with the prior settlement for 
$40,000, they would put the $32,000 settlement on the record regardless, the only enforceable 
settlement was the $32,000 settlement, he was potentially going to be sanctioned by the Court if 
he refused to put the $32,000 on the record (motions that Dinius and Dunbar subsequently 
brought), and he would spend thousands more in attorney fees fighting the issue (which has also 
proven to be true). Supra, Part I.B.4-5. That is not a voluntary decision. A voluntary settlement, 
after disclosure of the ethical violation and with advice of counsel, would have looked very 
different: Messerly would have explained on the record that an error had been made regarding 
unauthorized conduct but that it caused no harm because after further consultation with his 
counsel Kosmann had decided that the renegotiated settlement was preferred over the original 
settlement. That is the opposite of what Messerly stated on the record and thereafter.  
 Third, it is illogical to claim that the Idaho State Bar, rather than the District Court, 
should deal with the violation. This violation caused immediate and significant damages in the 
litigation, upending an existing settlement, and the violators were the first to file a motion asking 
the Court to bless their violation by enforcing the resulting new terms. It was impossible for the 
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District Court to avoid the issue – by enforcing the renegotiated settlement it was making the 
decision to ignore the violation and not void the new terms. The District Court was also being 
disingenuous: the District Court issued rulings suggesting no violation occurred, Dinius and 
Dunbar acted in good faith, Kosmann suffered no harm, and the settlement obtained through 
unauthorized contacts was still legally enforceable, rulings that (if left unchallenged) would have 
directed the Idaho State Bar to do nothing. In fact, the District Judge has not referred any of these 
ethical violations to the Idaho State Bar, despite the requirements in ICJC, Rule 2.15.   
2. Ethical Violation Should Have Resulted In Two Monetary Sanctions. 
  The appropriate minimum sanction for any ethical violation is to remedy any damages 
caused by the ethical violation, in order to make the party whole. See, e.g., Faison v. Thornton, 
863 F. Supp. 1204, 1221 (D. Nev. 1993) (“The court has broad discretion in fashioning an 
appropriate penalty or sanction to remedy the problems caused by an attorney's improper ex 
parte communications with a party represented by counsel.”). Here, there were two obvious 
damages. First, the initial damage was loss of a $40,000 settlement that was replaced with a 
$32,000 settlement, i.e. $8,000 in settlement funds should be reimbursed. Second, just as 
important, Kosmann incurred thousands of dollars in attorney fees because Dinius and Dunbar 
would not act reasonably to admit their error and pay the settlement amount they admit their 
insurer already agreed to pay. Early on, Kosmann offered to drop his attorney fees claim if 
Dinius would pay the $8,000. Instead, Dinius and Dunbar choose to deny liability, earn fees for 
themselves by litigating, and force Kosmann to incur many tens of thousands of dollars of fees to 
litigate for now more than a year. See, e.g., Idaho State Bar v. Souza, 142 Idaho 502, 506, 129 
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P.3d 1251, 1255 (2006) (“It is appropriate in attorney discipline cases to consider as an 
aggravating factor the degree of harm suffered by the client.”). 
Courts have consistently held that reimbursement of attorney fees is the appropriate 
sanction for parties that force litigation by refusing to admit and remedy ethical violations. See, 
e.g., Hammond v. City of Junction City, Kan., 126 F. App'x 886, 888–90 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Goswami v. DePaul Univ., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1015–19 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Parker v. Pepsi-Cola 
Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009–14 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Larry James Oldsmobile-
Pontiac-GMC Truck Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 175 F.R.D. 234, 246 (N.D. Miss. 1997); Faison, 
863 F. Supp. at 1221 (D. Nev. 1993) (awarding $45,600 in attorney fees incurred in proving that 
two attorneys violated Rule 4.2); Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Nev. 
2002) (“Sanctions for violating the rule have included disqualification of counsel, monetary 
sanctions, exclusion of information obtained by ex parte contact ….”); Featherstone v. 
Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194, 200–08 (Utah 2001).  
In this case, there are numerous aggravating factors for these ethics violations, including:  
 Dinius has eighteen years of Idaho legal experience, and Dunbar has thirteen years; 
 The ethical rule at issue is one that every lawyer follows every day in their law practice – 
you cannot talk with a represented party about the case; 
 This improper, ex parte communication happened during a formal mediation when there 
can be no debate that they knew Kosmann had counsel who was actively involved;  
 The improper communication was used to significantly impact a case –reducing a final 
settlement, to obtain a result they were unable to obtain while counsel was involved;  
 It is still unclear exactly why Dinius and Dunbar believed they could get around the no-
contact rule -- they keep suggesting different excuses; 
 They cannot claim Idaho law was unclear because the only applicable Idaho case says 
that they could not contact Kosmann without obtaining Messerly’s explicit consent; 
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 They cannot claim they believed the Runsvold case was distinguishable because they 
were not even aware of the case yet (nor would it be proper to do potentially unethical 
actions with the hope of convincing a court to authorize a loophole); 
 They cannot shift blame to Judge Dunn because they have not alleged that he told them 
Messerly had consented or that he told them not to tell Messerly; 
 They cannot credibly claim that they thought Messerly had consented because they admit 
they never asked anyone whether Messerly knew about the meeting or had consented; 
 They cannot credibly claim that they thought Messerly had consented because they knew 
Messerly despised and distrusted them; 
 They cannot claim they took any steps to err on the side of caution regarding their ethics; 
 They cannot blame Kosmann for initiating contact, since Rule 4.2 rejects that excuse; 
 They used the prohibited contact to violate the underlying policies for Rule 4.2 – 
including (1) tricking Kosmann into accepting a lesser settlement that had never been 
discussed with Kosmann’s counsel; (2) bad mouthing Kosmann’s attorney in order to get 
Kosmann to change the settlement that he had reached with the assistance of counsel; (3) 
falsely claiming counsel had committed malpractice in order to trick Kosmann into 
believing that the release of counsel was valuable; and (4) tricking Kosmann into paying 
$8,000 for a release that was not even for Kosmann; 
 They have shown zero remorse, instead claiming that they did nothing wrong and trying 
to blame everyone (Kosmann, Messerly, and Judge Dunn) but themselves; 
 Despite many months to research the issue and recognize their error, they did nothing to 
remedy the violation, instead the opposite – they have tried to profit off the violation; 
 Rather than just paying the additional $8,000 settlement their insurer had already agreed 
to pay, they chose to litigate to earn fees and force Kosmann to incur huge legal bills; 
 They have retaliated against Kosmann and Messerly for raising the ethics violation, 
bringing numerous frivolous sanction requests against Kosmann and Messerly; 
 Months into the litigation about their actions, they were still making incorrect claims 
about the law in Idaho and apparently had never researched the issue; 
 They have earned tens of thousands in fees in this case from Dinius’s malpractice insurer 
to litigate their own ethics violations;  
See ABA, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.22 (1991) (e.g., aggravating 
factors b, c, d, f, g, h, i, and j). These facts are deplorable and show that in addition to making 
Kosmann whole, the Court should impose a sanction that punishes Dinius and Dunbar for 
 
37 
abusive practices, deters them from future unethical practices, and encourages them to 
voluntarily admit and/or remedy ethical errors in the future.   
D. The District Court Incorrectly Enforced the Renegotiated Settlement Agreement. 
The proper resolution of this case is to recognize the ethical violation and remedy the 
damages and deter future unethical practices, as discussed above. However, the District Court 
also erred in its application of contract law to the renegotiated and original settlements. Kosmann 
briefly (due to lack of space) addresses these contract issues that should be moot.  
The District Court ordered that the renegotiated settlement would be enforced pursuant to 
Idaho contract law. This is alarming and contrary to law. Were this contract analysis to become 
the law of Idaho, every attorney-party would hire a lawyer and then try to communicate directly 
with the opposing party to negotiate a favorable settlement and avoid the protections of opposing 
counsel. If you could convince the opposing party to sign something or “put it on the record”, 
over the objection of their attorney (e.g. by bad-mouthing their attorney), then you would reap 
the rewards of this manipulative and unethical contact. Fortunately, this is not the law of Idaho 
and this Court has its pick of contract-related defenses3 to do justice and reject the new terms that 
were only discussed because of unethical communications, only agreed to initially because 
Messerly was not there to prevent manipulation, and only put on the record because of Dinius’s 
                                                 
3 For example: public policy (against obtaining settlements by violating ethical rules), see Trees 
v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 56 P.3d 765 (2002); failure of consideration ($8,000 for a release of 
counsel that was rejected by counsel), see IDJI 6.04.1; fraud (misrepresentations by Dinius 
during the secret meeting), see IDJI 6.27.1; mistake (about the release of counsel and about the 
Rule 4.2 violation), see IDJI 6.05.7; and substantive and procedural unconscionability 
(settlement obtained during prohibited contacts and giving up $8,000 in exchange for nothing), 
see, e.g., Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 72 P.3d 877 (2003). 
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manipulation of an ex-client during the ex parte meeting and because of subsequent threats and 
pressure by Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn.   
E. The District Court Incorrectly Sanctioned Messerly and Kosmann. 
 Messerly and Kosmann have not done anything that even hints at sanctionable conduct. 
The sole basis given for awarding Rule 11 sanctions is so trivial as to be frivolous: forgetting to 
file a motion for leave when making supplemental filings. Messerly fixed the error two days after 
he was alerted of it. Thus, even if a trivial procedural mistake could be sanctionable (it is not), as 
a matter of law it could not be sanctioned because of the 21-day safe harbor in Rule 11.  
1. Sanctions Were Awarded in Violation of Common Sense and Rule 11 Policy. 
It should be obvious that temporarily forgetting to file a motion for leave is not 
sanctionable conduct. Messerly provided the Court with numerous reasons why justice would 
never support such a sanction, including: (1) minor procedural errors are not sanctioned;4 (2) the 
temporary error caused no prejudice or damages; (3) Dinius made the exact same error when 
making supplemental filings; (4) the supplemental filings stated the good faith reason for why 
they were being filed, making a separate motion for leave duplicative; (5) Messerly has no 
history of sanctionable conduct; (6) the Court and Defendants submitted no caselaw in Idaho or 
anywhere suggesting monetary sanctions would be equitable; and (7) Dinius and Dunbar made 
                                                 
4 Rule 11 caselaw holds that it has no application to trivial procedural errors. See Campbell v. 
Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 650, 115 P.3d 731, 741 (2005) (“[Rule 11] is considered ‘a management 
tool to be used by the district court to weed out, punish, and deter specific frivolous and other 
misguided filings’ and should be exercised narrowly.”); see also FRCP 11, Notes of Advisory 
Committee on Rules—1993 Amendment (“Rule 11 motions should not be made or threatened 
for minor, inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed by subdivision (b).”). The 
District Court (and Dinius and Dunbar) just ignored this caselaw, again rejecting Idaho law. 
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greater procedural errors in just the process of seeking sanctions against Messerly and Kosmann. 
In three written rulings addressing the Defendants’ sanction requests, the District Court did not 
even acknowledge or address these common-sense arguments.  
2. Sanctions Were Awarded in Violation of the Mandatory Requirements of Rule 11. 
In addition to violating common-sense, the District Court violated the mandatory 21-day 
safe harbor requirement in Rule 11, which is legal error as a matter of law. Rule 11(c)(2) states,  
A motion for sanctions must be made separately …. The motion must be served 
under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged 
paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected 
within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets. 
see also FRCP 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1993 Amendment (“To stress the 
seriousness of a motion for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the 
rule, the revision provides that the ‘safe harbor’ period begins to run only upon service of the 
motion. In most cases, however, counsel should be expected to give informal notice to the other 
party … of a potential violation before … a Rule 11 motion.”); see also Barber v. Miller, 146 
F.3d 707, 710–11 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Carlsen was not given the opportunity to respond to 
Imageware's motion by withdrawing his claim … An award of sanctions cannot be upheld under 
those circumstances.”). It is undisputed that Dinius and Dunbar just filed a motion seeking 
sanctions without giving any formal or informal notice. It is also undisputed that Messerly 
“appropriately corrected” the error in two days. Therefore, it was contrary to law for Dinius and 
Dunbar to even have filed a motion seeking sanctions. See IRCP 11(c)(2). Shockingly, when 
Messerly pointed out this non-debatable violation of Rule 11’s requirements, Dinius and Dunbar 
did not apologize and withdraw the request for sanction and the District Court did not correct its 
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error of law and withdraw the sanctions. They openly ignored and rejected Idaho law.   
3. The District Court Should Have Sanctioned Dinius/Dunbar for Abuse of Rule 11. 
 Dinius and Dunbar used Rule 11 (and § 12-121) sanction requests for improper purposes: 
to harass, to run up attorney fees that got themselves paid by their insurance carrier while 
Kosmann had no funds to pay fees for his counsel, to obfuscate regarding their own sanctionable 
conduct, and to retaliate against Messerly and Kosmann. The District Court should not have 
allowed this abuse of Rule 11. See FRCP 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1993 
Amendment (“Nor should Rule 11 motions be prepared to … to intimidate an adversary into 
withdrawing contentions that are fairly debatable, to increase the costs of litigation, ….”).  
In this case, there are at least four indicia of abuse. First, remarkably, Dinius and Dunbar 
filed 7 different memorandums seeking sanctions against Messerly and Kosmann, and only when 
the District Court pointed out (in its October 5th Order) that such requests needed to be in a 
separate motion, did Dinius and Dunbar stop including the request in every brief they filed. 
Second, when Messerly and Kosmann filed a brief challenging the settlement, Dinius and 
Dunbar immediately retaliated with their first sanctions demand; when Messerly and Kosmann 
filed their first brief seeking sanctions regarding the violation of IRPC 4.2, Dinius and Dunbar 
again immediately retaliated and filed a cross-motion for sanctions. Third, Dinius and Dunbar 
never provided any legitimate reason for seeking sanctions. They sought sanctions for a trivial 
procedural error and because Kosmann was challenging their ethics violation and the validity of 
the settlement. Those are frivolous reasons. Fourth, and perhaps most egregious, when Messerly 
pointed out that the Rule 11 sanction violated the mandatory safe harbor, Dinius and Dunbar did 
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not withdraw the request for sanctions. Rather, they continued to argue for sanctions, ignoring 
the law, and they ultimately demanded and received payment from Messerly.  
 The District Court should have stopped those abuses of Rule 11 and this Court should 
impose a fee award against Dinius and Dunbar to deter future abuses of Rule 11. See FRCP 11, 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1993 Amendment (“[T]he court may award to the 
person who prevails … reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in …opposing 
the motion.”); see, e.g., Smith v. Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(awarding sanctions against party bringing motion for sanctions for improper purpose).   
F. The District Court Refused to Consider a Supporting Memorandum and Declaration.  
It is unclear,5 but potentially the memorandum and declaration filed on December 24, 
2017 were filed late. This Court, however, has also said that a Court has discretion to still 
consider any untimely filings. See Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 221, 384 P.3d 975, 985 
(2016). Here, the memorandum and declaration in support were filed well before the hearing date 
and the District Court did not give any equitable reason for why it refused to consider the filings. 
It exercised its discretion to promote a procedural technicality over substantive legal issues, 
contrary to law. See, e.g., Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 247–48, 
178 P.3d 606, 612–13 (2008) (“… this Court will construe the provisions of [IRCP] liberally in 
                                                 
5 Messerly initially conceded the issue of the memorandum and declaration being untimely, but 
upon further review the case law appears unclear. The cases reference a prior version of Rule 7 
that had language requiring memorandum and affidavits to be filed jointly with the motion. The 
current IRCP 7 has language indicating that the supporting memorandum does not have to be 
filed at the same time as the motion and the filings just need to be filed fourteen days before the 
hearing date, see IRCP 7(b)(3)(A) & (D). IRCP 59(c) requires affidavits to be filed at the same 
time as the motion, but that rule is inapplicable to this case, see IRCP 59(e). 
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order to resolve cases on their merits instead of on technicalities.”). The substantive arguments 
and evidence in the memorandum and declaration should have been considered. Of course, even 
ignoring those filings, the record is clear regarding the District Court’s many errors. 
G. If Remanded, This Case Should Be Remanded to a Different Judge 
 If the Court remands for further substantive proceedings, then Kosmann requests that the 
Court send the case to a different judge. Without belaboring the point, as discussed in detail 
above, the District Judge disregarded the law, repeatedly got the law wrong, ignored common 
sense, refused to even acknowledge most arguments raised by Kosmann, showed clear bias for 
Dinius and Dunbar (and Judge Dunn), and twice used improper Rule 11 sanctions to intimidate 
and wrongfully punish Kosmann and Messerly for seeking to enforce basic ethical rules. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
 
Kosmann is entitled to an award of his reasonable appellate attorney fees pursuant to 
three independent bases: contract, I.C. § 12-121, and damages from ethical violations. First, 
Dinius is trying to enforce the settlement agreement that he submitted after the mediation. That 
settlement agreement stated, in pertinent part, 
15. ATTORNEYS’ FEES. The prevailing Settling Party in any litigation or other 
enforcement action concerning, relating to, or arising out of this Agreement shall be 
awarded its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with such 
litigation or enforcement. 
R.Vol. III, p.29. This litigation is “concerning, relating to, or arising out of” the settlement 
agreement that Dinius tried to enforce. As discussed above, Kosmann should be the prevailing 
party regarding the settlement terms. Dinius is obligated to pay Kosmann’s “reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with such litigation,” which includes attorney 
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fees on appeal. See Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 414–15, 258 P.3d 
340, 349–50 (2011) (”Where a court holds a contract is unenforceable, the prevailing party may 
nonetheless be entitled to an award of attorney fees under the contract.”); O'Connor v. Harger 
Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909–12, 188 P.3d 846, 851–54 (2008). 
Second, the arguments raised in this case by Dinius and Dunbar are frivolous. The 
Runsvold case is controlling authority. Dinius and Dunbar provided no reasonable argument for 
why Runsvold should be distinguished consistent with the known policies of IRPC 4.2. Similarly, 
their seven sanction request against Kosmann and Messerly were frivolous and unsupported by 
case law. Dinius and Dunbar acted frivolously in causing over a year of litigation disputing an 
obvious ethical violation that had an easy remedy that would have avoided all this litigation and 
fees. This is exactly the type of case where this Court should award attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 
§ 12-121. See, e.g., Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 631–32, 329 
P.3d 1072, 1079–80 (2014) (Dinius pursued claims known to be unsupportable).   
Lastly, as discussed above, case law across jurisdictions holds that ethical violations 
should be remedied by awarding attorney fees caused by having to bring litigation to prove up 
the ethical violation. Supra, Part III.C.2. Appellate fees are part of the damages flowing from this 
ethical violation. Equity demands an award of these damages that were both caused by Dinius 
and Dunbar and easily avoidable by Dinius and Dunbar by merely fixing their ethical violation 
(and perhaps a disgorgement of the fees that they earned by requiring this litigation).  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For all the reasons stated above, the Kosmann respectfully request that this Court reverse 
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the District Court and: (1) confirm that Dinius (with Dunbar and Judge Dunn’s assistance) 
violated IRPC 4.2 when, during formal mediation, he met alone with the opposing party without 
first obtaining consent from opposing counsel for that meeting, (2) remedy the ethical violation 
by voiding the renegotiated settlement, awarding the $8,000 in lost settlement funds, and 
reimbursing all post-mediation attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees, incurred by 
Kosmann because of Dinius’s refusal to voluntarily remedy his ethical violation, (3) unwind the 
Rule 11 monetary sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly and return their funds, with interest, 
and sanction Dinius and Dunbar for their abusive use of Rule 11 to harass and retaliate, and (4) 
remand to a different district judge for any further proceedings.  
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of July, 2018. 
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